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ABSTRACT
Self-driving vehicles are known to be vulnerable to different types of attacks due to the type of com-
munication systemswhich are utilized in these vehicles. These vehicles are becomingmore reliant on
external communication through vehicular ad hoc networks. However, these networks contribute
new threats to self-driving vehicles which lead to potentially significant problems in autonomous
systems. These communication systems potentially open self-driving vehicles to malicious attacks
like the common Sybil attacks, black hole, Denial of Service, wormhole attacks and grey hole attacks.
In this paper, an intelligent protection mechanism is proposed, which was created to secure exter-
nal communications for self-driving and semi-autonomous cars. The protectionmechanism is based
on the Proportional Overlapping Scores method, which allows to decrease the number of features
found in the Kyoto benchmark dataset. This hybrid detection system uses Back Propagation neural
networks to detect Denial of Service (DoS), a common type of attack in vehicular ad hoc networks.
The results from our experiment revealed that the proposed intrusion detection has the ability to
identify malicious vehicles in self-driving and even in semi-autonomous vehicles.
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1. Introduction
Over the past few years, the traditional internet has
expanded to include aubiquitous networkwhichwe refer
to as Internet-of-Things (IoTs), which features Machine
to Machine (M2M) communication with the ability to
provide an efficient connectivity for self-driving vehicles
(Zhang, Liang, Lu, & Shen, 2014).
Vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) are known as
wireless mobile networks which permit self-driving vehi-
cles to easily exchange information such as Coopera-
tive Awareness Messages (CAMs) amongst one another
and road side units (RSUs) in their communication area.
VANETs are poised to enhance road safety and make ser-
vice comfortable on busy roads. These networks have
the ability to exchange warning messages, notification
messages, control data and CAMs between neighbour-
ing vehicles. It is possible for a malicious attack to be
launched from any location within the radio area at any
time in suchwireless networks as they lack a firewalls and
gateways. Moreover, a malicious attack does not require
physical access to the vehicle, as it would be the case
with wired networks (Erritali & El Ouahidi, 2013). Each
vehicle can potentially be compromised because they
are exposed and the car is allowed to move indepen-
dently without any physical protection from intrusion
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(Zhang et al., 2014). Self-driving vehicles rely on partici-
pation of other vehicles within the radio coverage area as
the external communication uses a decentralized archi-
tecture. Potential attackers could thus try to break the
supportive protocols between the vehicles and the RSUs.
In VANETs, systems security approaches such as encryp-
tion/decryption mechanisms and digital signatures can
be utilized to decrease the amount of potential attacks,
which can be seen as the first layer of defence. Nonethe-
less, there is a need for a second layer of defence in place
for self-driving vehicles to detect and even identify not
previously seen attacks (that could not be prevented by
the incumbent systems security identified above).
Malicious behaviour in vehicles can be detected ini-
tially through the communication of CAMs, via the vehic-
ular ad hoc network between self-driving vehicles and
even with their road side units. Every intrusion detec-
tion system proposed to protect the routing protocols of
VANETs of self-driving vehicles faces to principle prob-
lems: (1) providing protection to the transmitted data
from one vehicle to the next (i.e. device to device) and
(2) protecting and monitoring every CAM which is trans-
mitted between vehicle’s road side units. An IDS can be
seen as more efficient way to identify an intruder in the
external communication of self-driving vehicles (Erritali &
© 2018 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use,
distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
SYSTEMS SCIENCE & CONTROL ENGINEERING: AN OPEN ACCESS JOURNAL 49
El Ouahidi, 2013). The IDS requires the ability to capture
anddoa thoroughexaminationof everypacketwhichhas
been received or transferred between vehicles. This pro-
cess is known as audit data. The security system needs to
be able to detect normal and even abnormal behaviours
using the audit data which was obtained from VANETs.
An IDS is composed of three phases:
• Data collection phase.
• Analysis data phase.
• Response phase.
In general, two types of detection systems for behaviour
security system that are misuse and anomaly detection
system. Each of them has advantages and disadvantages
which had direct impact on detection performance of
any protection system. Misuse detection is a scheme
to identifying network and computer attacks. Abnormal
behaviour is established in misuse detection to detect
any other behaviour is normal. In the same time, abnor-
mal behaviour is defined in anomaly detection to identify
from normal behaviour. However, the misuse detection
can not detect novel/new attacks, but it is fast and high
accuracy with low rate of false alarms. The high rate of
false alarms is big disadvantage of anomaly detection in
security system.
A hybrid IDS is proposed here for misuse-based detec-
tion and anomaly-based detection utilizing Back Propa-
gation artificial neural networks (ANNs) in combination
with fuzzy sets, to allow for the prediction of occur-
rence of attacks on the external communications of self-
driving and semi-autonomous vehicles. This IDS should
be todetect various typesof cyber-attacks likeDistributed
Denial of Service (DDoS) and network scanning. Addition-
ally, the hybrid security system has the ability to iden-
tify and isolate malicious attacks on network. The Kyoto
dataset is employed to analyse the performance met-
rics of the proposed hybrid security system (Song et al.,
2011).
The basic structure of communication system in self-
driving vehicles is shown in Figure 1. It describes two
types of communication in VANETs which are: vehicle to
vehicles (V2 V) and vehicle to road side units (V2R). This
type of network can provide a communication environ-
ment for self-driving and semi-autonomous vehicles that
enable to exchange importantmessages and control data
between mobile nodes in that radio coverage area.
The contributions of this research are summarized as
follows:
• An intelligent IDS using Back Propagation neural net-
works to detect abnormal/ malicious behaviours for
autonomous and semi-autonomous vehicles.
Figure 1. Basic structure of vehicular ad hoc network.
• The proposed intelligent intrusion detection is not
dependent on expensive external hardware such as
Radar, Lidar, computer vision, or any RSUs.
• The security system is relied on the Proportional Over-
lapping Scores scheme, which allows to decrease the
number of Kyoto benchmark dataset features.
• In this paper, hybrid detection system is proposed to
identify Denial of Service that was based on Back Prop-
agation neural networks.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows:
section2details the stateof the art., section3provides the
benchmarkdata set collection. Section4presents thepro-
posed protection mechanism, while section 5 provides
simulation results. Section 6: discusses the results and
section 7 details the conclusion and future work.
2. Literature reviews
It is expected that in the next five years more than 250
million vehicles will be connected with RSUs (Internet of
Things & Smart Cities, 2016). Both the self-driving and
semi-autonomous vehicles will be very important ele-
ments in the IoT domain, with the projection that by
2020 one in every five vehicles will have wireless com-
munication capability (Internet of Things & Smart Cities,
2016).
Petit et al. researched potential threats and cyber-
attacks on automation and cooperation automated vehi-
cles (Petit & Steven Shladover, 2015) The result of this
research shows that these vehicles can be associatedwith
many different types of attacks. Furthermore, the vehicles
need to be created with the awareness of threats in mind
and thus this needs to be included during the initial stage
development of self-driving vehicles.
In the area of the IoT (Zhang et al., 2014), Zhang et al.
offered a survey for defensive schemes and attacks such
as Sybil attacks. There were three serious types of Sybil
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attacks that were defined by the authors, namely; SA-
1, SA-2, and SA-3; these attacks have a direct negative
impact on performance and privacy data of smart objects
in IoT.
Alheeti et al. proposed intelligent security systems to
provide protection to external communication of self-
driving vehicles (Alheeti, Gruebler, & McDonald-Maier,
2015). These systems have the capacity to detect both
grey hole and rushing attacks utilizing an IDS based on
Support Vector Machines (SVM) and Feed-Forward Neu-
ral Networks, with SVMbeing identified asmore accurate.
Additionally, Tahir et al. provided a security system for
the networked sensor systems (Tahir, Tahir, & McDonald-
Maier, 2015). In their system, they used the inherent fea-
tures of a device in order to generate a safe identity for
devices in their area.
In (Kang & Kang, 2016), authors utilized deep neural
network (DNN) in designing intrusion detection system
to secure communication systems of vehicles. The pro-
posed system is heavily based on communication fea-
tures that are extracted from packets. It has the ability to
identify normal and abnormal/malicious connection. The
security system plays important role in protect data that
sent/transferred between vehicles in that radio coverage
area.
The outlier detection system is proposed to prevent
any abnormal behaviour that was has direct and negative
impact on performance of any system (Jabez &Muthuku-
mar, 2015). It is heavily based on Neighbourhood Out-
lier Factor (NOF) in generating anomaly database. A hug
dataset is utilized in trained and tested security system to
measure its detection accuracy. A novel security system
can effectively detect malicious behaviour from others.
Li and et al can find relation between rational cloud
resource defender and the potential malicious user (Alra-
jeh, Khan, & Shams, 2013). This relation plays important
role in the cloud as a differential game is investigated.
The result of the proposed system can support a theo-
retical foundation in identifying the abnormal attack. In
addition, it can help cloud intrusion detection system in
creating optimal decision for systems.
A comparison of various ways which reflects the
present case of identification and standardizationof open
problems of security and privacy of automotive vehicles
was made by Petit et al. (Petit, Florian, Michael, & Frank,
2015). This provides a survey of the problems and require-
ments of vital security in self-driving vehicles. This survey
focuses on pseudonym methods, which depend on keys
of cryptography mechanisms.
In his previous works, the author researched IDS
systems which focused either on detecting misuse
(Sato, Yamaki, & Takakura, 2012) or abnormal behaviour
(Ahmed, 2009). In this paper, we proposed a first system
Table 1. Below shows the type of features.
Feature name Feature source
Duration, Service, Source bytes, Destination bytes, Count,
Same srv rate, SError rate, Srv serror rate, Dst host count,
Dst host srv count, Dst host same src port rate, Dst host
serror rate, Dst host srv serror rate and Flag
KDD Cup 99’
IDS_detection, Malware_detection, Ashula_detction,
Label, Source IP Address, Source Port Number,
Destination IP Address, Destination Port Number, Start
Time and Duration
Real Network
which address both, the detection of misuse and abnor-
mal behaviour through a hybrid IDS that provides pro-
tection and detects attacks in external communication of
self-driving and semi-autonomous vehicles.
3. Benchmark data set collection
The data selected for the evaluation of a proposed IDS
is an important factor. In the past, researchers used the
KDD Cup 99’ data set for analysing the performance of
proposed security systems (KDD99-Cup, 1999). Nonethe-
less, we did not make use of this data in this research
work because it suffers from major issues of not provid-
ing enough current and recent network topologies and
latest attack trends. This data is out of date and based on
a system simulation over ten years ago (Song et al., 2011).
The Kyoto benchmark is used to carry out the testing
and evaluation of performance of the proposed (KDD99-
Cup, 1999). It is created for the real traffic data on a net-
work. This important data was obtained over a three-year
period. This Kyoto data has two types of data:
(1) Kyoto data set with Internet Protocol (IP) source and
IP destination.
(2) Kyoto data set without IP.
We made use of the first option because it uses a
label field identifying normal and abnormal connection.
It is a Kyoto data set which consists of twenty-four fac-
tors which shows normal and abnormal behaviour of
a network. We derived the first fourteen features from
the previously indicated KDD Cup 99’ data set, while the
remaining features were obtained from a real network
(Table 1).
Security system researchers recommended the use of
this data set in newly proposed IDS’ due to the fact it pro-
vides amore practical as well as accurate evaluations and
results (Song et al., 2011).
4. The Proposed Intrusion Detection System
The detection system and decreasing the number of fea-
tures required from the data sets can be seen as the
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Figure 2. Overall intrusion detection system architecture.
core contributions made in this research work. The num-
ber of features utilized has a significant role to play in
the effectiveness and the performance efficiency of the
proposed security system. Memory requirements, com-
putation time, andaccuracy are the keydriversbehind the
decrease in number of features that are being processed
by the system. It has four phases which include;
• The pre-processing phase.
• The features selection phase.
• The fuzzification phase.
• The training and testing phase.
The proposed intelligent IDS uses a Multi-Layer Per-
ception (MLP) which involves four layers: two hidden lay-
ers, one output layer and an input layer. The fuzzification
data used for the input data of the first layer possesses
65 neurons. The number of neurons and hidden layers
depend on the accuracy of the training phase. There are
12 neurons in the first hidden layer while the second
one has just five neurons. The proposed security system
consists of three values in the output layer which are:
unknown, normal, and abnormal.
The following outlines the steps that explain the
methodology of the IDS and the how we were able to
decrease the number of required features while main-
taining the detection accuracy with fuzzification. Figure 2
shows the overall IDS architecture.
4.1. Pre-processing data set phase
Wemade use of the Kyoto benchmark dataset to analyse
the performance of the security system. There is a need
for pre-processing stages with this data set, i.e. uniform
distribution, encoding, and normalization.
(1) Encoding stage: Some features are presented with
symbols such as: ‘SO’, ‘REJ’, ‘RSTO’, ‘SF’. Beforemaking
any changes to the data set, we needed to con-
vert symbol features to numerical values. This is a
vital process because the feature vector fed to the
input layer of back-propagation (BP) and needs to be
numerical.
(2) Uniform distribution stage: This is needed with BP to
ensure accurate training. We gathered and prepared
60,000 data set records to be used in simulation of
the proposed security system. The system dataset is
divided into three subsets with each using a different
number of normal and abnormal records, randomly
obtained from the original dataset. They have the fol-
lowing properties: In a situationwhere the number of
normal pattern is T. subset and the original dataset
contains D samples, then there is a chance of find-
ing a sample of class normal in the first subset D/T
samples of the final data. Therefore, every subset that
belongs to the final data set contains almost the same
distribution and ratio of record type of the full data
set.
(3) Normalization of numerical attributes stage:
According to the equation 1, each numerical is value
set between 0.0 and 1.0. ANN training is often more effi-
cient with normalized data; it is used as the preferable
predictor.
x = x − min
max - min
(1)
where x is the normalized value with a range between 1
and 0, x is the original value, max and min are maximum
and minimum values of the original variable. These val-
ues are utilized in matching the upper and lower limits
of the activation function sigmoid which are used in the
ANN models. We set some data set aside in the training
phase for validation to overcome a common issue in ANN,
over-fitting that occurs often during the training phase.
This is avoided by stopping the training process when
the validation errors increase for a specified number of
iterations.
4.2. Extract the impact of features input phase
In the design of the detection system, the feature selec-
tion and the ranking process for important features are
key (Alheeti, Al-Jobouri, &McDonald-Maier, 2013). Hence,
efficient and effective performance of the IDS mostly
relies on the number and type of Kyoto features. Alter-
natively, the removal of less important features enhances
the rate of detection, reduces the computation time and
memory requirement, therefore improving the overall
performance of an IDS. Table 2 shows the effect of the
suggested IDS on the time training and consumption of
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Table 2. Performance metrics.
Metrics IDS with all features IDS with 13 Features
Memory Consumed 72e05b 52e05b
Time 24.31s 21.53s
the memory. Applying 13 features decreases the time
needed by 11.4% and the required memory by 27.7%.
The significant features are chosen to raise the detec-
tion accuracy and to decrease the volume of the false
alarms. A statistical approach is utilized to choose impor-
tant features which have a high weight value and a criti-
cal effect, based on the Proportional Overlapping Scores
(POS) technique (Mahmoud et al., 2014).
In order to avoid an outliers effect, the POS is cal-
culated for every feature in Kyoto benchmark. In this
situation, the important features selection relies on the
measure for the overlap value. The designer can set
the dataset size of the selected features (Official site for
PropOverlap package, 2016). POS is often considered the
most suitable and efficient method among the common
types of dataset (Mahmoud et al., 2014). Additionally, it
is considered effective even with a dataset which has
classification issues like high-dimensional binary and out-
liers (Official site for PropOverlap package, 2016). POS is
used to measure the overlapping rate in the dataset. The
recognition features are obtainedby calculating the over-
lap between feature values present in the Kyoto dataset
across two classes. The statistical language R is utilized
for programming the POS method which pseudocode is
presented below:
Proportional Overlapping Scores Algorithm
1. inputs: ‘data1.csv’.
2. output: Sequence of the selected features.
3. install.packages(‘propOverlap’).
4. source(‘ http://bioconductor.org/biocLite.R’).
5. biocLite(‘Biobase’).
5. library(propOverlap).
6. ?propOverlap.
7. getwd().
8. data < - read.csv(‘data1.csv’,header = T).
9. str(data).
10. data < - t(data).
11. G < - data[1:23,] # define the features matrix 23.
12. G < - jitter(G). # to avoid the noise in data
13. class < - as.factor(data[24,]) #define class labels.
14. set.seed(1234).
15. selection < - Sel.Features(G, Class, K = 23,Verbose = TRUE) # the
main function.
16. selection$Features. # extract the number of features
17. selection$Measures. # extract name of features.
Each feature is taggedwith the overlap value and then
the features that bears the lowest weight are removed.
The trial-and-error is utilized to determine the opti-
mal number of extracted features based on detection
Table 3. Significant features.
Significant feature name Feature source
Duration, Service, Source bytes, Destination bytes,
Count, Dst host count, Dst host srv count, and Flag
KDD Cup 99’
Label, Source IP Address, Source Port Number,
Destination IP Address, Destination Port Number
and Duration
Real Network
accuracy in the training phase for ANN (Ali Alheeti et al.,
2015). Hence, we began with 23 features and we calcu-
lated the training accuracy and removed features that
had less impact in the detection process after each round
of training.
We were able to accomplish 99.18% training accuracy
with 13 features which defines the normal and abnormal
behaviour in the Kyoto benchmark. Thus the first contri-
bution of this paper is reducing the number of features.
The proposed IDS analysed every feature and identified
the 13 selected features. These significant features are
shown in the Table 3 below.
4.3. The fuzzification phase
Fuzzy sets are seen as a popular solution for a dataset
that suffers from classification issues (Ramkumar &
Murugeswari, 2014). Choosing the correct features from
the Kyoto benchmark dataset has a positive and direct
influence on the performance of the proposed IDS
(Alheeti, Venus, & Suleiman Al Rababaa, 2009). When the
number of features is reduced the classes used to identify
normal andmalicious behaviours is not clearly separated.
The rate of detection in this case, declines and results in
an increase of the number of false alarms.
The fuzzification process has the capacity to create a
clear border within important features to resolve such
classification issues (Ramkumar & Murugeswari, 2014). In
Table 4, we have shown the role of the fuzzification in
improving results.
f (x, a, b, c) = max(min(x − a/b − a, c − x/c − b), 0) (2)
where, x is the normal value of the dataset before fuzzifi-
cation while a,b and c values represent the fuzzy domain
values. The proposed security system is ultimately more
efficient with fuzzification data (Ali Alheeti, Gruebler, &
McDonald-Maier, 2015). Thus, it has the ability to over-
come the confusion or ambiguity through redistributing
each feature valuewith new five values. Equation 2 allows
each value from the selected features to take five values
from the fuzzy domain with interval range is [0, 1].
Table 4 shows comparative analysis results for various
configurations of the IDS.We analyse the IDS against a full
set of features.We also analysed it against a decreased set
of features to assess the performance of the system.
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Table 4. Performance metrics.
Metrics IDS with all Features IDS with 13 Features IDS with 13 Fuzzification Features
Misuse Detection Normal 97.5% 99.79% 99.23%
Misuse Detection Abnormal 99.2% 64.34% 99.05%
Anomaly Detection Normal 92.04% 60.35% 99.04%
Anomaly Detection Abnormal 99.85% 98.45% 99.06%
Unknown Rate 28.5 0% 0.03
Average FP Alarm 2.27% 23.61% 1.82%
Average FN Alarm 1.01% 7.38% 0.4%
Average Error Rate 1.9% 19.32% 0.88%
Training Parameter Epochs 115 75 27
Table 4 also highlights the vital role of the fuzzification
dataset in improving the rate of detection, reducing the
amount of false alarms and error rate. Additionally, fuzzi-
fication features have a positive reflect on the training
phase for ANN by reducing the number of epochs.
4.4. The training and testing phase
The IDS, uses a well-known supervised learning of neural
network architecture known as Multi-Layer-Perceptron
(MLP) with back back-propagation gradient-descent in
thedesigned security system (Alheeti et al., 2009). In order
to form a feed-forward multi-layer in MLP, the collection
of non-linear neurons is connected to one another (Al-
Naqshabandi, 2007). This technique is known to be very
useful for prediction and classification issues. Figure 3
illustrates the graphical representation of the initial MLP
employed in this research. Cross-validation is used to
determine the ‘optimal’ numberofhidden layers andneu-
rons which were relied on the experimental design of the
IDS. Particularly, the training of the MLP began from a
small number of neurons, andwith only one hidden layer,
which measures the error ratio of the trained BP on hold-
out samples, slowly increasing the number of neurons at
the hidden layer in which the performance of the trained
phase on holdout samples has begun to go down due
to the problem of overtraining. Thus, we obtain the best
number of neurons for the hidden layer of the ANN.
Figure 3. Graphical representation of our MLP neural network
model.
Weemployed a 100-fold cross-validation to reduce the
bias related with the process of randomly separating the
Kyoto data set into testing phase and training phase. The
network training is ended when the Least-square-error E
between the desired di and actual outputyi is less than
Emax or when the number of sweeps equal 500.We define
Emax=1 ∗ 10−7.:
E = 1
2P
P∑
P=1
m∑
i=1
(yi − di)2 (3)
where p is the total number of training patterns, and:
di =
[
1 If the training pattern ∈ ithcluster
−1 otherwise
]
For all experiments, the learning rate α was fixed to 1 ∗
10−7. A trial-and-error approach is employed to iteratively
get the optimal training accuracy rate. Table 5 illustrates
some of the configuration parameters employed in the
ANN.
In the following phase, the detection phase, we tested
the security systemwith important features thatwe chose
from the Kyoto benchmark data set. We analysed their
behaviours and used the IDS to generate four types of
alarms: true negative, true positive, false negative and
false positive (Alheeti et al., 2015). These rates of detec-
tion accuracy and alarms are used to calculate the per-
formance of IDS. We have three outputs in the detection
phase which includes: unknown, normal, and abnormal.
We created the simulation on a system making use of
an Intel core i3 processor operating at 2.53GHz and 4GB
RAM memory. In addition, the proposed security system
is shown in Figure 4 that has been configured on each
vehicle to identify abnormal activates on the external
compunction system in self-driving vehicles.
Table 5. Artificial neural network parameters.
Parameter Value
Train Parameter epochs 81
Train Parameter ln. 1*10−7
Train Parameter goal 0
Train Parameter Minimum Gradient 1*10−11
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Figure 4. System architecture.
We categorized the test dataset into three categories
in the testing phase which includes unknown, the nor-
mal and the abnormal. We employ the misuse and
anomaly detection so that our ANN can efficiently learn
the small andmalicious behaviours via the iterative oper-
ation (Using Artificial Intelligence to create a low cost
self-driving car, 2016).
In this paper, a hybrid intelligent detection system
is designed to secure external communication systems
of autonomous vehicles. It was different from the pre-
vious security systems by which it has ability to detect
a novel intruder. Moreover, the proposed security sys-
tem can reduce the number of features that have been
extracted from the Kyoto dataset. Therefore, the number
of those features has been distributed by utilizing fuzzy
sets which has an important role in improving accuracy
of detection system and reducing the rate of alarms. The
intelligent hybrid security system that proposed in this
research has the ability to detect abnormal behaviours for
self-driving vehicles. In addition, it has the ability to pro-
tect the external communication system of autonomous
vehicles.
5. Experimental evaluation and results
The proposed protectionmechanismemployed a dataset
of 60,000 records to define the normal, abnormal and
unknown behaviour in networks. The data set employed
in our analysis was obtained from the Kyoto University, as
shown above (Koyoto dataset, 2016, April). The accuracy
of the training algorithm is = 99.18%. The accuracy of
the detection is calculated based on Equation 4 below
(Alheeti et al., 2009):
Accuracy = Number of correctly classified patterns
Total number of patterns
(4)
TPRate(sensitivty) = TPTP + FN (5)
TNRate(specificity) =
TN
TN + FP (6)
FNRate = (1 - sensitivity) = FNFN + TP (7)
FPRate = (1 − specificity) = FPFP + TN (8)
The data setwas divided into three subsets: the test set
(25%), the validation set (25%) and the training set (50%).
5.1. Training and testing IDSwithmisuse detection
We employed the misuse scheme in creating the IDS. It
has two features, which are low false alarms and high
detection rate. Thenumber of records and the accuracy of
the detection rate that were employed in our IDS is illus-
trated in Tables 6 and 7 demonstrates the rates of alarms
of the proposed IDS.
The alarm rate and error rate that are generated from
the security system are shown in Table 7. Equations (5–8)
are utilized in calculating the alarm rate.
5.2. Training and testing IDSwith anomaly
detection
The training and testing of the proposed security system
are performance with the Kyoto data set (KDD99-Cup,
1999). We discovered that the proposed IDS performance
is directly related to anomaly detection algorithm. In a
Table 6. Classification rate.
Class Original No. Neural No. Accuracy
Normal 6895 6829 99.04%
Abnormal 3105 3076 99.06%
Unknown 0 4 0.04%
Table 7. Alarm and error rate.
Alarm Rates
True positive 99.59%
True negative 97.99%
False negative 0.40%
False positive 2.00%
Error Rate 0.95%
SYSTEMS SCIENCE & CONTROL ENGINEERING: AN OPEN ACCESS JOURNAL 55
Table 8. Classification rate.
Class Original No. Neural No. Accuracy
Normal 6640 6887 99.23%
Abnormal 3060 3031 99.05%
Unknown 0 3 0.03%
Table 9. Alarm and error rate.
Alarm Rates
True positive 99.60%
True negative 98.34%
False negative 0.40%
False positive 1.65%
Error Rate 0.82%
case were the anomalies are correctly detected from the
data set, it offers a high detection rate and also less false
alarms. The detection of the anomaly provides the capa-
bility to identify novel attacks. Our experiment shows that
the IDSperformance is largely impactedby the typeof the
training data.
The system measured the classification rate and gen-
erated four types of alarms for the suggested IDS as
illustrated in Table 8.
Table 9 demonstrates the rate of four alarms and error
rate of detection systemof communication of self-driving
vehicles.
Here we present a hybrid intelligent detection system
that was different from the previous intrusion detection
systems by which it has ability to identify a novel attack.
However, the proposed system can reduce the number of
features that have been extracted from the Kyoto bench-
mark dataset. Moreover, the number of those Kyoto fea-
tures has been distributed by utilizing fuzzy sets which
has an important role in improving accuracy of detec-
tion system and reducing the rate of alarms. The intelli-
gent hybrid security system that proposed in this paper
has the ability to detect malicious behaviours for self-
driving vehicles. In addition, it has the ability to secure the
external communication system of autonomous vehicles.
6. Discussion
Conventional security systems do not have sufficient
capacity to provide adequate security to the external
communication of self-driving and semi-self-driving vehi-
cles. There is a serious need to improve security in order to
ensure functionality and quality of service in these types
of networks.
The rate of alarm in our paper lays between 97.99%
and 99.60%. This facilitates an efficient rate of detection
with an average rate error of 0.88%, while the previous
best accomplished average error rate was 8.68% (Ali
Alheeti, Gruebler, &McDonald-Maier, 2015). In (Ali Alheeti
et al., 2015), the average rate of false alarms is at 4.86%,
while we accomplish 1.64% presented here. Thus the
hybrid IDS performance is efficient in identifying DoS of
communicating self-driving vehicles. With this result, we
can safely decrease the number of features and fuzzifica-
tion data in enhancing the performance of the security
system.
Furthermore, we can overcome overlapping problems
with theproposed IDSbyusing thePOSapproach inorder
to choose the significant features and apply fuzzy set
‘fuzzification’ to the features thatwe extracted. Intelligent
IDS can provide protection to the VANETs of self-driving
vehicles by identifying and blocking novel behaviours
which target vehicles by affecting the communication
between self-driving and semi self-driving vehicles. We
can observe the vital role of the IDS from our experi-
ment in enhancing the external security of communica-
tion vehicles under various conditions. The IDS directly
affects the performance of the network by enhancing the
rate of detection, as well as reducing the number of false
alarms and the error rate.
In this paper, the proposed system is evaluated with
new dataset to test the detection performance with an
other dataset. Assessing the detection performance of
theproposed IDSwith anewdataset is important to check
the efficiency of the protection system. Thenewdataset is
extracted fromtrace file of ns-2. Thenormal andabnormal
behaviours are generated to test the proposed security
system.
7. Conclusion and future work
In this work, we have been able to design a hybrid IDS
which combines MLPs with POS and fuzzy sets to identify
the behaviour of connected communicating vehicles. The
proposed intrusion detection system employs an intel-
ligent misuse and anomaly detection method in identi-
fying the malicious behaviour in VANETs of self-driving
vehicles which safely adapts to heterogeneous commu-
nicating environment.
The security system has the capacity to identify the
malicious vehicle which is a source of an attack by
employing the hybrid IDS. It can address the issues of
malicious intrusion in self-driving vehicles. This scheme
was created for the testing phase and the training phase
of two system scenarios: normal and abnormal behaviour
which is based on the Kyoto data set. The IDS is employed
to evaluate the behaviour of each vehicle to identify if it
is a vehicle causing DoS or just a normal vehicle. In a situ-
ation where the car is trying to prevent the access to the
resources of the network and render them unavailable at
any time, this is shown as a DoS vehicle. The hybrid pro-
posed BP-IDS has the capacity to differentiate between
existing, novel or new attacks.
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The experiment shows IDS performance in identifying
and isolating DoS. It is good for protecting the exter-
nal communication of self-driving vehicles. Additionally,
it possesses the capability to identify external and internal
attacks launched on the network at any time.
With our proposed IDS, malicious self- driving vehi-
cles can be isolated with high rate of detection and can
guarantee low false alarm. The process of reducing the
features by POS technology has an important role to
play in improving the rate of detection of the proposed
IDS. Additionally, the fuzzification data help reduce the
amount of false alarms and error rate when compared
with our previous publication. In future work, there is
a need to use the IDS on VANETs based utilizing a vir-
tual communications layer, and we anticipate a further
improved intrusion behaviour.
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